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IS GOD JUST? 
Timothy P. Jackson 
I defend in this essay the seemingly uncontroversial thesis that God is just. By 
highlighting the kenotic nature of God's essential goodness, I rebut arguments 
by Marilyn Adams, Thomas Morris, and William Alston to the effect that God 
is too sublime to be bound by obligations to creatures. A straightforward 
acknowledgement that the God who is Love has freely chosen to be (not mere-
ly seem) just, is required by fidelity to Scripture as well as by religious experi-
ence. Thus is Christianity's incarnational faith unHellenized ... again. 
" ... let him who glories glory in this, that he understands and knows me, 
that I am the Lord who practice steadfast love, justice, and righteousness 
in the earth; for in these things I delight, says the Lord." (Jeremiah 9:24) 
Is creation ... botched? (Gustavo Gutierrez)' 
It would be troubling indeed for most believers if God, the paradigmatic 
person, were not just. Yet three influential philosophers of religion -
Marilyn Adams, Thomas Morris, and William Alston - have recently 
argued for this conclusion or for theses that directly entail it. In the name 
of divine transcendence or necessary goodness or holy indeviance, they 
deny that God can have obligations of right to creatures. I try here to say 
why this view seems mistaken. My counterclaim is that, far from God's 
essential nature precluding justice, God is just precisely because essentially 
loving. I appeal to two general criteria, Scripture and the experience of the 
pious, but my primary touchstone is the logic of the Incarnation. God's 
justice is kenotic, my radical Athanasian line runs: God suffers Herself to 
be bound to us morally, for our good. 
1. Three Arguments Against God's Justice 
A. Adams and tIle God of the Gap: In 'The Problem of Hell: A Problem of 
Evil for Christians," Marilyn Adams contends that God is neither just nor 
unjust - at least not with respect to human beings. There is too big an "onto-
logical gap" between creatures and their Creator to use the language of "jus-
tice" or "injustice" in describing their relation. God and humanity are "incom-
mensurable,"2 and this translates, for Adams, into divine antinornianism: 
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[C]reated persons have no rights against God, because God has no 
obligations to creatures: in particular, God has no obligation to be 
good to us; no obligation not to ruin us whether by depriving our 
lives of positive meaning, by producing or allowing the deteriora-
tion or disintegration of our personalities, by destroying our bod-
ies, or by annihilating us.3 
God has no duty to care for finite persons, evidently, nor even an obliga-
tion not cruelly to torment them. God's nonjustice is not a matter of contin-
gently avoiding all ensnaring relations with humans, like a hermit who 
flees from the world in order not to be morally responsible to or for any-
one. It is (onto)logically impossible, Adams thinks, for God to bind Himself 
in justice to finite persons such that He has a duty to relate to them in any 
particular way whatsoever. Following Anselm and Duns Scotus, she 
affirms that "God is not the kind of thing that could be obligated to crea-
tures in any way"; and she does not flinch from the logical implication that 
"God will not be unjust to created persons no matter what He does."4 
Adams rejects divine obligation (and with it divine justice) not because 
she fears that God may in fact be cruel or creation botched but because she 
believes that God's love for creatures infinitely transcends anything that 
can properly be called obligatory.s For Adams, God's charity is so sublime 
and gratuitous that we denigrate the Deity (and inordinately elevate our-
selves) by speaking in terms of "rights and duties," "claims and counter-
claims," or "justice." I have considerable sympathy for this disinclination 
to use the language of "rights" with respect to God and Her relation to the 
world. The primary moral attribute of the biblical God is steadfast love 
('hesed, agape), a willing of the good for all creation, that vastly outstrips the 
contractual balances of power that individuals living in a secular culture 
tend to identify with justice. If an agapic attitude of voluntary service is to 
be at the heart of a Christian's attitude toward the neighbor, she rightly 
downplays any talk of "rights and duties" that amounts to prudential self-
assertion. Nevertheless, Adams is mistaken in her categorical denial of the 
existence of divine obligations. The biblical tradition's reference to "the 
justice and mercy of God" is not to be abandoned but rather rehabilitated 
in nuanced opposition to common secular parlance. "Shall not the judge of 
all the earth deal justly?" (Genesis 18:25)0 
In the spirit of Adams, I grant that the God of Genesis has no essential 
obligations to anyone or anything, in as much as He might not have creat-
ed the world of finite persons and objects to begin with, and this without 
diminishing His goodness. Presumably, God would still have been 
omnipotent, omniscient, and innocent of any wrongdoing had He never 
brought the universe into being. But the Gospels and the personal experi-
ences of many religious believers suggest that kenotic obligations for God 
are not only possible but actual. In a divinely reflexive Akedah, God has 
voluntarily bound Himself in obligation to creatures - by making promises 
to them, for instance. Indeed, the free self-limitation of omnipotence for 
humanity's sake is at the very heart of the pathos of Scripture. 
Consider two basic facts: 0) Scripture is replete with instances of divine 
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"promises" in which God is represented as binding Herself (e.g., Her 
promise to Abraham concerning the fatherhood of Isaac, Her pledge to 
Noah concerning the nonrepetition of the flood, Her covenant with Israel 
concerning the survival of the nation). Sometimes the commitment is 
hypothetical, and sometimes the prophetic "promise" is more like a threat 
(d. Amos and Hosea), but in both cases obligations of justice seem freely 
incurred. In the absence of any place for divine obligation, these biblical 
passages must be given a heavily metaphorical or analogical reading, in 
which it is only as if God has bound Herself to keep Her word.7 Yet this 
leaves God in the awkward position of being incapable of a number of per-
formative utterances usually thought to be central to moral agency, as well 
as to biblical narrative. One does not have to be a biblical literalist to feel 
that it is a strained exegetical approach which evacuates the Gospel in par-
ticular of its character as narrated promise.8 
(2) As important as it is to protect charity against the corrosive effects of 
modern contract theory by insisting that love rises above the demands of 
secular justice/ love can never fall below such justice into unfairness or 
arbitrariness and remain love. Adams's suggestion that God will not be 
unjust whatever He does is motivated by the desire to protect God's 
majesty and sovereignty, but it risks making Him seem capricious. The 
God who became incarnate in Jesus Christ has indeed promised not to be 
cavalier or cruel, I would contend, out of a charitable concession to human 
doubt and frailty. Covenantal love, which at base is unconditional, may 
nevertheless employ explicit contract as a means of expressing and further-
ing the good of the other. In New Testament terms, Love has nailed Himself 
to the cross of justice. God's binding Himself to obligation does not mean 
that He ceases to act out of love; it is not as though God could be a reluc-
tant Kantian doing his duty out of respect for the moral law alone, all the 
while fighting an inclination to be abusive or self-indulgent. Self-giving 
love remains the (or at least a) divine motive, but it is now a love that has 
committed itself in justice to behave in a certain way. A God who cannot 
do this seems a mere abstraction. 
For the sake of fallen persons, the God who is Love has surrendered 
some of Her spontaneity - some of Her infinite room to maneuver - and 
given creatures a genuine claim against the Deity. Subsequent to the 
divine promise, then, God's duty and humanity'S rights are real rather 
than merely apparent. Subjunctively to echo Jonah, we "would do well to 
be angry" were God to break a promise; but, of course, She never does. At 
times, we (like Jonah) think God unjust, but this is only because we fail to 
understand the precise nature of Her promises andlor the precise form of 
Her fidelity to them. This, at any rate, is what the Bible would have indi-
viduals believe. It is one thing to say that God will not break Her promis-
es; it is another to say that She cannot make them. In insisting on the latter, 
Adams undermines the very pastoral confidence in the Creator that she so 
clearly wants to bolster. 
B. Morris and God's Necessary Goodness: Thomas Morris bases his case 
against divine obligations on the necessity of God's essential attributes, 
particularly His goodness, coupled with a libertarian account of freedom. 
If God is necessarily good, then He cannot but do what is right. But if He 
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cannot but do what is right, then He does not fulfill obligations, since such 
fulfillment requires freedom and (according to the libertarian) freedom 
requires the ability to do otherwise. Morris still thinks that what he calls 
"the duty model" can be adapted to help explain God's goodness. But the 
point is that God is not bound by duty and its rules, even though He acts in 
accordance with duty and its rules: 
We human beings exist in a state of being bound by moral duty. In 
this state we act under obligation, either satisfying or contravening 
our duties. Because of his distinctive nature, God does not share 
our ontological status. Specifically, he does not share our relation 
to moral principles - that of being bound by some of these princi~ 
pIes as duties. Nevertheless, God acts in accordance with those 
principles which would express duties for a moral agent in his rel-
evant circumstances. And he does so necessarily.'° 
The motivation behind these lines is the desire to avoid conflict between 
(1) a libertarian account of freedom, in which true freedom with respect to 
action X requires the ability to do other than X, (2) a belief in God's neces-
sary goodness, and (3) an explanation of God's goodness in terms of His 
freely fulfilling his duties. With Morris, however, as with Adams, "the 
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Anselm" so transcends obligation as appar-
ently to fall below it. For, as Morris realizes, merely acting in accordance 
with duty is often seen as defective dutifulness. More on this later. 
C. Alston and the Impossibility of God's Deviance: William Alston has 
offered a slightly different account of why God can have no obligations, 
defending "the view that a necessary condition of the truth of'S ought to do 
A' is at least the metaphysical possibility that S does not do A" The upshot 
of this view is that "no moral obligations attach to God, assuming, as we are 
here, that God is essentially perfectly good."" For Alston, unlike Morris, 
freedom with respect to some action X does not require the ability to do oth-
erwise; but obligation does require such an ability. If there is no "possibility 
of deviation"'2 from duty, there is no duty either. So, again, because God 
necessarily does what is right, She cannot be obligated by justice. 
The problem with Alston, as with Morris, is that he fails to see that 
God's essential goodness does not consist in His necessarily doing what is 
right but in His freely doing it. With creation and incarnation, God's good-
ness participates in the contingency of the world. If this were not so, He 
could not respond to finite agents as they are. Granted, God would not be 
God were He not omnibenevolent, so the attribution of goodness to Him is 
de dicto necessary. But if, as seems plausible, freedom is an internal compo-
nent of the exercise of all virtue (love and justice), then God's occurrent 
goodness cannot be de re necessary. If God ceases to be good, then He 
ceases to exist; but this self-extinction is now a real possibility, I would 
maintain. The possible death of God is a consequence of His choosing to 
create beings in need of love and desirous of justice, since the need and the 
desire may logically be the occasions for divine dereliction. God's death 
could only be suicide, but for believers in the Judeo-Christian God there 
seems no denying that He could freely forsake us and thus cease to be. In 
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making His covenant with" Abram" (Genesis 15), it is God who symbolical-
ly walks between the sacrificial animals cut in two, thereby staking the 
divine Life itself on His voluntary fidelity.13 And, indeed, the terror of the 
cross is not merely the painful death of a innocent man but the temptation 
of a good God to betray Himself, and thus to die. 
Talk of "the death of God" may sound impious or absurd - how could 
an essentially good and necessary Being cease to exist? - but it is neither, if 
carefully construed. My account of divine justice retains the Christian belief 
that in God goodness and power coincide. I depart from exponents of 
divine impassibility, however, in taking God's benevolence to condition Her 
might. To experience God is to feel oneself touched by that perfect Reality 
that sustains the world, but we must revise our understanding of perfect 
strength in light of God's kenotic love. Divine power is not a self-sufficient 
Greek immutability, a detached narcissism, but rather a passionately self-
sacrificial creativity. This thesis is perhaps as old as Job, arguably present in 
Saint Paul (Phil. 2:7), asserted inconsistently by Origen, and theologically 
self-conscious as a possibility by the time of Athanasius. 14 The most power-
ful Christian argument in support of the thesis is the cross, the decisive reve-
lation of God's will to redeem humanity via even suffering and death. 
Necessary existence cannot be thought of as a perfection, Anselm 
notwithstanding/5 if this precludes God's creating free beings to whom He 
can relate redemptively; to create and relate morally (including justly) to 
creatures, an act of agape, God must open Himself to the possibility of not 
being. Again, omnibenevolence qualifies what we may think of as 
omnipotence. "God is love" (I John 4:8) is perhaps the one nonequivocal 
thing we can say about the Deity, and this implies that if all love ceases so 
does God. An all-powerful Being cannot be brought into or taken out of 
existence by something else, or by degrees, but it might wink out at once of 
its own accord. To admit this is to clear the way for worship of God's actu-
al steadfastness, not to thwart or denigrate it. 
In claiming that God might cease to exist, I take exception to Spinoza's 
sentiment that "To be able not to exist is want of power." Spinoza reasons 
that "since ability to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs 
to the nature of some thing, the more power it will have to exist; and 
accordingly a being absolutely infinite, or God, has an absolutely infinite 
power of existence from itself, and on that account absolutely exists."J6 Yet 
why cannot God's supreme power be construed as the ability to exist or 
not exist, as She wills? This seems as plausible a conception of self-causa-
tion, of having existence internal to one's essence, as any other. And it is 
required if we are to do justice to God's charity for the world and for the 
finite beings in it. A necessarily existent Being might open Herself to the 
possibility of nonexistence, I hold, for the same reason that a timelessly 
eternal Being might enter time, and a perfectly good Being might suffer 
temptation: for the salvation of sinners. 
What, then, does divine necessity amount to? I would repeat that God's 
necessary existence implies that He cannot be taken out of existence by 
something outside Himself, nor can He fade by increments. I would even 
grant that "God exists necessarily" entails that "God exists" cannot be 
false, i.e., is a necessary truth and thus is true in all possible worldsY But if 
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God freely implodes, so to speak, so do all possible worlds. As properties 
of intelligible propositions, truth and falsity (both possible and necessary) 
require a mind;1' but if God ceases to be, so do all minds (both finite and 
infinite), thus so do truth and falsity. In this sense, "God exists" is not false 
in any (or all) possible world(s) even if God ceases to exist. "God does not 
exist" is not so much a necessary falsehood, though it may be called that, as 
the refusal of the very idea of truth and falsity. Truth and falsity stand or 
fall with God Himself, even as do good and evil. Indeed, insisting that 
"God is just" is a true statement in this world does not imply that "God is 
unjust" might be a true statement in some other world, for, again, the 
divine injustice would entail the end of all worlds, the end of all minds, the 
end of all truth, the end of God Himself. God's justice presupposes that He 
might be unjust, in the limited sense of fall simultaneously into nonexistence 
altogether, but no one could ever know this utter nullity from which He 
freely preserves Himself, and us. 
To say that a divine action is free is not to say that it is unreliable. We 
can be confidant of God's goodness without fatalism, for we can trust that 
She does not fail and will not fail without insisting that She cannot fail. 
Only a profound pessimist would think that all freedom must tend to cor-
ruption or inconstancy; only a misguided Platonist would prefer a dispas-
sionate and unchanging theoretical Deity over the compassiona te and 
faithful biblical God. The first person of the Trinity is not impassible in cre-
ating and overseeing the world; and the incarnate Son on the cross experi-
ences dread, an ineliminable accompaniment of temporal freedom, though 
He does not sin. The Judeo-Christian God is worthy of worship exactly 
because Her fidelity to love neither necessitates Her nor extinguishes oth-
ers. (Again, divine freedom makes creaturely agency possible, by volun-
tarily letting it be voluntary.) If God were not relevantly free, then She 
could not rightly be admired for Her goodness or thanked for Her graces, 
since She could not be or do otherwise. 
I trust my central point is now clear enough: pace Spinoza et al., the ability 
not to be is not an imperfection but rather the necessary condition for the 
divine perfection witnessed to in the Bible. Nevertheless, let me summarize 
my position as strongly as I can, and then I will make a little concession. (1) 
The biblical God is a just Creator who makes binding promises to creatures; 
(2) since freedom (partially defined as the ability to do otherwise) is internal 
to all good and evil, to be just requires the ability to be unjust; (3) to be even 
potentially unjust is, for the God who is essentially good and whose exis-
tence follows necessarily from His essence, to be potentially nonexistent; 
therefore (4) God is potentially nonexistent. This is the case at least after 
God's voluntary creation of the world. If we want to call God "just," in 
short, as Scripture and piety seem to demand, then we must grant that He 
could cease to exist. We could never know that He had ceased, however; 
God's nonexistence is the one existential proposition about which no one in 
heaven or on earth could ever have justified true belief. 
Now for the small concession. I have assumed (with Morris) that a liber-
tarian account of freedom is compelling, but this is far from uncontroversial. 
Those who find moral freedom compatible with determinism, perhaps 
defining freedom (with Harry Frankfurt) as roughly the ability to act as you 
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want/9 will take exception to my four points. These points may seem high-
ly anthropocentric, for instance, as if God has to have a dubious liberty 
human beings seem to lack in order to love or be jusUV 1 am inclined to 
defend libertarian freedom as crucial to the defense of God's goodness and 
the rejection of pernicious notions of irresistible grace. (Those who would 
be comforted by the thought of God predetermining, ineluctably, the bliss 
of "the elect" should be willing to surrender this abstract consolation for the 
sake of those who suffer doubt and would be thrown into despair by the 
idea of a fated damnation.21 ) Still, at a minimum, 1 can put my main thesis 
hypothetically: if freedom requires the ability to do otherwise, then it is bet-
ter to grant that God could be other than just (even cease to exist) than to 
deny that She is ever just. For if we gainsay divine justice, we have to reject 
divine goodness as well: ex hypothesi, God's goodness also requires libertari-
an freedom. This rejection is too high a price to pay. An unfree God is not a 
just God, and a nonjust God cannot be fully loving either. A fully loving 
God freely makes kenotic promises to creatures; even if the promises 
restrain the divine freedom, they also presuppose it. 
T1. Love Embracing Justice: An Instructive Analogy 
Let me offer an analogy to help clarify how the God who is Love may 
nonetheless become freely obliged in justice. Imagine that a woman suc-
ceeds in embodying the virtue of neighbor-love in virtually everything that 
she says and does. Her actions are dedicated to the well-being of others, 
many of them deeply afflicted, and her motives are un selfconsciously 
beneficent; she is animated by the Holy Spirit and gives little or no thought 
to "rights" (especially her own) and "duties" (especially other people's). 
Far from being grudging or one-dimensional, her life is radiant and happy, 
if occasionally winded. (I think of someone like Mother Teresa of Calcutta, 
though gender is unimportant; Albert Schweitzer also comes to mind.) 
Imagine now that this saint begins visiting a secular friend who has inoper-
able cancer. The friend, touched by the attention, feels loved for the first 
time in his life. As the pain worsens, nonetheless, the friend fears the lone-
liness and suffering that are likely to accompany his final days, so he asks 
for an explicit vow that the woman agree to visit him till the bitter end. 
"Promise you won't abandon me," he implores. 
Might not the woman make such a promise, out of love and for the friend's 
sake, and thus become genuinely duty-bound? The woman might very 
well have intended to keep up her visits in any case; she may even be a lit-
tle hurt that the friend needed a formal vow; but once the commitment is 
made, admittedly as a concession to his fear and mistrust, is it not a real 
obligation? I think that reasonable persons would concur that it is. I think, 
moreover, that God's relation to creatures is rather like this: a characteristi-
cally voluntary self-sacrifice to meet us where we are. As Athanasius says, 
"for one seeking to heal and teach[,] the way is, not simply to sojourn here, 
but to give himself to the aid of those in want, and to appear as they who 
need him can bear it .... "22 
The God of Abraham and Isaac, Mary and Jesus, loves human beings 
steadfastly and continues to promote their good come what may, but as a 
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response to their finitude and sin, their anxiety and uncertainty, He has 
given them concrete promises which He is obliged to honor. His motive in 
making the promises is love; His motive in keeping them is perhaps some 
combination of love and justice; but God is genuinely bound by His word 
as a matter of justice. God's making promises is not merely the announce-
ment of His intentions, and God's keeping promises is not merely action in 
accordance with (rather than out of) principles of duty. Some forms of 
divine obligation are close to impossible: God could not promise to cease to 
love, for instance, at least not so as to remain in being. But God did not 
merely induce Abraham to believe that Isaac was "the child of promise" or 
behave as if He had given Noah a pledge of never again destroying the 
earth; rather, the promise and the pledge were literal obligations undertak-
en by a charity that found its fullest expression in the Incarnation. If justice 
is, formally, giving each their due, then human beings are now due what-
ever God has promised to them. It is not too much to say, therefore, that 
finite persons now have a claim against God - though this is a claim that 
God has freely given them without antecedent merit on their part. It is not 
the upshot of a right that creatures might have assel:ted independently of 
the divine benevolence. Love precedes justice and often rises above it, but 
love also sometimes stoops to embrace justice, thereby limiting itself. 
Divine charity makes kenotic promises, to reiterate thereby bridging the 
"ontological gap" made so much of by Adams and her medieval forebears. 
Would God be God if He did any less? 
III. A "Third Alternative" Rejected 
Someone might object that I have neglected a third alternative to (a) a 
God who does not promise, and thus is not bound, at all and (b) a God 
who makes promises, and thus is bound, to creatures. What of the possi-
bility of God binding Herself to Herself, making promises not to creatures 
but for them? Hebrews 6:13-15, for instance, reads: "For when God made a 
promise to Abraham, since he had no one greater by whom to swear, he 
swore by himself, saying, 'Surely I will bless you and multiply you.' And 
thus Abraham, having patiently endured, obtained the promise." Does 
this not amount to a tertium quid between Adams et al. and myself?23 
I don't think so; this putative third option in fact collapses into my own. 
Though God's swearing ''by Himself" is a unique means to executing an 
oath, the end is still that of promising "to Abraham." It is Abraham who 
"obtains the promise," not God, thus God becomes obligated to a creature, 
not merely to Himself. We do speak of "promising ourselves" something, 
but genuine promising normally requires two parties. This is especially 
relevant here, for what reason could a loving God have to promise only to 
Himself? God swears by Himself to reassure Abraham that He will keep 
His promise to him - to render the patriarch "fully convinced that God 
was able to do what he promised," in Saint Paul's words (Romans 4:21)-
rather than to avoid incurring such an obligation. 
Adams, Morris, Alston, and my imaginary objector all underestimate 
the power of divine condescension. Alston in particular helps us see, mal-
gre lui, an irony that is typical of God's way with the world. Let us sup-
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pose that obligation does presume "the possibility of deviation," even if 
(pace Morris) freedom does not presume the ability to do otherwise. Let us 
further suppose, however, that Scripture can here be taken literally and 
hence that (i) God has in fact obligated Herself and so (ii) She is actually 
characterized by the possibility of deviation. Alstonians will see this as a 
hard paradox, asking: How could and why should an essentially perfectly 
good Creator embrace the possibility of Her not being good? Necessary 
goodness is incompatible with the possibility of doing evil. The defenders 
of divine justice, in contrast, will see (i) and (ii) as a splendid irony, answer-
ing:God embraces (possible) deviation kenotically, for the sake of making 
meaningful promises to creatures. The irony resides in the fact that, in 
order to be able to promise at all, God must freely empty Herself of Her 
self-sufficiency such that She might break whatever specific promise She 
makes. The splendor consists in the ineffable humility of this sacrifice of 
the strong for the weak, a sacrifice that opens purity to the possibility of 
impurity to redeem the already impure. 
In sum, God's being bound by duty to creatures and accepting the man-
tle of (possible) guilt initially seems antithetical to His supreme goodness, 
but this condescension is actually an instance of God's omnibenevolence 
trumping His omnipotence - or rather its revolutionizing our idea of 
omnipotence. God chooses tenderness over impassibility, a service to the 
weak that risks becoming embroiled in their weakness over a sublime 
detachment that remains essentially aloof. With the Fall of humanity, God 
drives Himself out of the Garden as well. God makes promises for humani-
ty's sake, not His own; He obligates Himself in order to address human 
fear and mistrust, to meet finite persons where they live. This pattern of 
sacrifice is familiar from the life of Jesus, who though divine permitted 
himself to be genuinely tempted and painfully killed. 
IV. Two Implicit Promises 
Apart from the explicit promises to Abraham, Noah, Moses, et al., 
already mentioned, there are at least two actions of God that carry an 
implicit promise: the Creation and the Incarnation. Let me bolster my 
cumulative case for a just God by examining these in slightly more detail. 
This will require a digression on the problem of evil, but my subsequent 
Conclusion can be quite brief. 
Whether or not God created the best of all possible worlds,24 in creating 
this one and calling it "good," She was in effect guaranteeing that it was 
worth it, that on balance it is better that this world be than that it not be. 
Since God might not have made anything at all, this is a promise that She 
might not have given. But God's having created persons amounts to Her 
having pledged that each of their lives can be meaningful taken as a whole, 
or else She is unjust. In general, if bringing about X is known to be harmful 
overall or otherwise wrong, then knowingly bringing about Y amounts to 
an implicit promise that it is not X-ish. Hence God's creating the world 
implicitly guarantees that it is not harmful overall for Her to have done so. 
The standard problem of evil looms large here: what are we to make of 
those human lives beset by affliction and absurdity through no fault of 
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their own?25 I doubt that there is any argument in the face of such evil that 
constitutes a strict theodicy. I am also inclined to endorse Marilyn 
Adams's heartfelt opinion that even sins "freely" committed do not 
deserve endless punishment and thus cannot be cited as justifying a tradi-
tional conception of hell. Just punishment is unobjectionable, but even 
God must make the punishment fit the crime. Sympathy for the horror of 
some lives, even when that horror is self-inflicted, is an indispensable 
moral emotion urging one to doubt any doctrine of the permanent damna-
tion of the wicked.26 Unlike Adams, however, I do not insist that there be a 
"definitive divine triumph"" amounting to universal salvation in a tradi-
tional heaven. We may hope for the latter, but we can only hope. I suspect 
(with Barth, von Balthasar, and others) that if there is eternal life for any-
one, freely accepted as a good gift of God, then there is eternal life for 
everyone, similarly accepted. But the goodness of God may be affirmed 
even if there is an afterlife for no one, as the example of Job indicates. 
Love's priority may be to cultivate persons in this life only. There is that 
much truth in Stoic Christianity. 
If it could be shown that God had promised immortality (construed as 
never-ending-personal-existence) to believers, then He would indeed have 
bound His goodness and justice to this gift. But I am not sure how to inter-
pret those biblical passages (e.g., Matthew 8:11-12 and 19:28-30) that refer 
to the "kingdom of heaven" and "eternal life." Jesus does seem to have 
believed in the final resurrection of the faithful, but does this represent a 
divine covenant? Perhaps. In light of several verses in John (e.g., 6:47 and 
17:3), however, immortality may be interpreted qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively - "eternal life" being taken to mean an existence permeated 
by the loving presence of God here and now, rather than in a remote after-
life.28 An old issue ... 
My final reaction to the problem of evil (natural and moral), in any case, 
is to allow that, whatever God's reason for creating a world where evil is 
possible, Her response to it once it is actual is an incarnational one. 
Against those traditionalists who see God as impassible, however abstract-
ly benevolent, I see the heart of Her agape to be a kenosis that accepts both 
obligation and suffering.29 Indeed, obligation is a form of suffering. After 
all is said and done with respect to the free will defense, the claim that pain 
and vice somehow redound ad maiorem gloriam Dei, the argument that evil 
is an illusion, etc., a viable Christian faith will always turn on two things: 
confidence in God's promise that creation is finally good and Her kenotic 
presence with us sharing our doubt and grief even when it seems very 
very bad. To let either one of these themes go, even in the name of enrich-
ing our conception of God's charity, is to impoverish it instead. 
It is often pointed out that the "Augustinian" interpretation of God's 
love as a sublimely detached benevolence rules out His suffering with 
creatures30; it is not so frequently pointed out that the Plotinian-
Augustinian God cannot experience obligation to creatures either. 
Professors Adams, Morris, and Alston are exceptional in frankly acknowl-
edging that their positions entail the impossibility of a divine duty to crea-
tures. Nevertheless, I believe that an adequate view of God's love will 
affirm both divine suffering/sympathy and divine obligation/duty. This dual 
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affirmation is founded on the nature of the Incarnation, my key criterion. 
As the fullest revelation of God's agape, the Incarnation itself involves both 
a Passion and a Promise. Indeed, the Promise is implicit in the Passion; so 
great a suffering, freely accepted, implies that God will be with human 
beings even in and through their worst pain. If God cannot make promis-
es, then He cannot incarnate either. 
Let me try to make the foregoing more plausible by engaging in a theo-
logical thought experiment. At the heart of the experiment is a distinction 
akin to that between God's antecedent and consequent will: a contrast 
between Her antecedent and consequent love. Before that kenosis called 
Creation, I imagine that God was rather like the "Augustinian" Deity: sim-
ple and impassible, experiencing unabated joy within Her own perfect 
beauty and goodness. At this stage, God's love consisted exclusively in 
self-love, a reciprocal benevolence for the Persons of the Trinity. Prior to 
Her creation of finite beings, God was arguably without both obligation 
and suffering. Neither divine duty (narrowly construed) nor divine sym-
pathy (literally construed) existed, for they were not needed. The charity 
between the three Persons of the Trinity was uninterrupted bliss and suffi-
cient unto itself, hence God possessed that sort of sublime aloofness that 
some ascribe to the Deity perpetually. With creation, in contrast, God 
binds Herself in justice to creatures as well as opening Herself in compas-
sion to their pain. The Creation was not itself motivated by duty or sym-
pathy; God did not owe us existence as a debt of obligation, nor did God 
take pity on our nonexistence. But having been voluntarily offered, cre-
ation does open God to moral claims against Her: the creative Word is a 
performative utterance, in that sense. The very existence of created "other-
ness" entails an obligation not to violate that creation. Or so I imagine. 
On an "Augustinian" view, as noted, God cannot manifest sympathy or 
incur a real duty - neither in time nor in eternity - since He is uncondi-
tioned and cannot be truly affected by or bound to a free reality outside the 
Godhead.31 This account fails, however, to appreciate the revolutionary 
character of both the Creation and the Incarnation as love's keJlosis. For 
Platonic rationality, the divine is typically something liberated from the 
human, a matter of attaining timeless order and control by transcending 
spatia-temporal chaos. Christian faith in effect reverses the Hellenic vision: 
the divine must be permitted to descend into the human, a matter of 
redeeming the tlesh incarnationally rather than escaping or denying it noet-
ically. Plato did not despise the body, but (with Aristophanes) he evidently 
did see sexual longing, the present existence of the sexes themselves, as due 
to a loss of original unity and thus as something to be overcome. This is 
quite contrary to the spirit of Genesis 1:26-27 where embodied maleness 
and femaleness, together, are part of God's original plan, part of what it 
means to be made in the divine Image. (Even the second, less egalitarian 
biblical creation story [Genesis 2:4b-3:24] calls woman "a helper fit for 
[man].") Plato is no dualist and his praise of eros is unrivalled, but his ideal 
is finally one of contemplative self-sufficiency in which the body is forgot-
ten. The biblical ideal, however often violated, is relational and corporeal to 
the core. For Socrates in The Symposium the key temptation is to be all too 
human, aroused to bodily passion by Alcibiades. The great Satanic tempta-
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tion for Christ in the Gospels (e.g., Matthew 4:1-11), in contrast, is to be, so 
to speak, merely divine, above human need and fellow-feelingY 
We might very well ask with the Psalmist, "What is man that Thou art 
mindful of him?" But it is possible to glimpse the splendor of divine love 
by contrasting it with the squalor of human sin. The two divine acts of cre-
ation and incarnation represent mysteries infinitely greater than and oppo-
site from the Fall of humanity. Whereas Adam and Eve fell from inno-
cence into guilt and from obedient dependence on God to a would-be self-
sufficiency, God "fell" from pure self-love into a love embracing justice for 
others and from actual self-sufficiency into a willingly suffering relation 
with others. (As Simone Weil taught us, a person moved by grace, unlike 
by gravity, falls upward.) The Incarnation suggests, in particular, that sub-
sequent to the Creation God wills to be with the world in its pain; and this 
motive is itself what leads Her to take on obligations well beyond the one 
implicit in creation. The Incarnation is the promise of God's self-sacrificial 
presence in time so long as time exists, even unto the end of the world. 
And Immanuel is the only distinctively Judea-Christian response to the 
problem of evil.33 This incarnational response is not a philosophical justifi-
cation for evil34; nevertheless, rather like Job we may find the suffering 
company of a just and loving God enough. 
Conclusion 
"[M]an is by nature mortal, inasmuch as he is made out of what is not" 
- so says Athanasius35 - and in light of this sentiment, even a firm faith in 
personal immortality must appreciate it as an utterly gratuitous gift from 
God. Unlike Athanasius, I do not believe that survival beyond this life is a 
necessary condition for God making good on either the Creation's or the 
Incarnation's implicit pledge. It may be sufficient that, with the help of the 
Holy Spirit, individuals are able to love here and now. But, again, the 
question of how God will fulfill His promises is separate from whether He 
has made any. Marilyn Adams, Thomas Morris, and William Alston hold 
that it is impossible for God to become obligated to creatures (via promises 
or any other way); someone might think, in opposition, that God could 
obligate Himself but has not actually done sd6 ; I have embraced the other 
alternative and characterized divine obligations as both possible and actu-
al. God's goodness is not exhausted by His promise-keeping, but the latter 
is indispensable to the former, lest both creation and Creator be botched. 
Is God just? If I am correct, there are no rational reasons to deny Her 
justice and many biblical and personal ones to affirm it. Indeed, for indi-
viduals who are to love God with all their heart, as well as with all their 
soul and mind, the challenge is not simply to assert God's justice but to 
imitate the divine love that makes that justice real. This means binding 
ourselves in service to others ... "incarnating" ... easier said than done. 
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